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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA:
A REPLY
Louis J. SIRICO, JR. t
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Deficiency
Judgment Act,' it sought to protect the debtor. 2 Prior to 1941,
the price realized at the foreclosure sale conclusively determined
the value of the mortgaged property.3 The rule could prove dis-
astrous for the defaulting mortgagor. The mortgagee could
purchase the property at the sheriff's sale for a nominal amount
and then successfully claim that the mortgagor still owed the out-
standing amount of the loan secured by the mortgage minus the
proceeds from the sheriff's sale.4
Similar scenarios also were possible in other states. The De-
pression of the 1930's led many legislatures, including Penn-
sylvania's, to take remedial action. The various legislatures
enacted five types of statutes that still remain in use.5
t Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. Yale Univer-
sity, 1967; J.D. University of Texas, 1972. I thank Professor Robert Washburn
for reviewing this piece. I also thank my research assistant, Jeffrey Margulies.
1. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103 (Purdon 1982). A copy of the Penn-
sylvania Deficiency Judgment Act is reprinted in the Appendix to these articles.
The current Act is substantially a reenactment of the Act ofJuly 16, 1941, No.
151, 1941 Pa. Laws 400.
2. See First Pennsylvania Bank v. Lancaster County Tax Claim Bureau, 504
Pa. 179, 190, 470 A.2d 938, 944 (1983) (policy objective of Act is "to protect a
debtor from personal liability by limiting liability to the fair market value of real
estate collateral"); Union Trust Co. v. Tutino, 353 Pa. 145, 148, 44 A.2d 556,
558 (1945) (legislative intent in passing Act was "to protect judgment debtors
whose real estate is sold in execution, by requiring the [creditor] to give credit
for the value of the property he purchased at his execution and not merely to
credit the price at which it was sold"). The 1941 Act is entitled "An Act to
protect the debtors, obligors or guarantors of debts for which judgments are
entered or may be entered ... by prescribing the method of fixing the fair mar-
ket value of such property sold on execution, and limiting the amount collectible
thereafter on such judgments." Act of July 16, 1941, No. 151, 1941 Pa. Laws
400. For a history of the 1941 Act that demonstrates the tenacity of the legisla-
ture in devising constitutional remedial legislation, see 2 G. LADNER, CONVEY-
ANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA § 12.28(a),(b) (4th ed. 1979).
3. See In re White's Estate, 322 Pa. 85, 89, 185 A. 589, 591 (1936) (price
realized at foreclosure is conclusive upon parties as to value of mortgaged prem-
ises and mortgagee has personal claim against mortgagor for any deficiency,
even if mortgagee purchased property at foreclosure sale).
4. See id. at 88, 185 A. at 590 (property was sold at foreclosure sale for $50
and mortgagee then sought to collect deficiency between $50 sale price and
$3,207 debt).
5. For a description and analysis of these various types of legislation, see
Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response lo Price hladequacv i Vor-ag-e Fore-
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The first type prohibits deficiency judgments when the initial
property transaction falls into a certain category, such as a
purchase money mortgage, mortgage on a homestead, private
sale, abandoned property, or sale with a short redemption
period.6
The second type authorizes courts to issue remedial orders. 7
Some statutes permit courts to deny confirmation of the foreclo-
sure sale for such reasons as inadequacy of sales price, failure of
the sales price to exceed an advanced bid, or substantial irregular-
ities in the sale procedure. Some statutes permit courts to set
aside confirmed sales in certain situations. Other statutes permit
courts to establish an upset price that the sale price must equal or
exceed in order to obtain judicial confirmation. Still other stat-
utes authorize courts to enjoin or delay sales when severe eco-
nomic conditions prevail.
The third type requires the court or office conducting the
sale to appoint an appraiser to evaluate the property.8 Some stat-
utes forbid confirming a foreclosure sale if the price bid falls short
of a statutory percentage-usually two-thirds-of appraised
value. Other statutes grant the mortgagor credit for the ap-
praised value in calculating the remaining debt.
The fourth type is a miscellany of protective devices.2' They
include a requirement that the mortgagee exhaust its security
before seeking a money judgment; a requirement that the mort-
gagee elect between either suing on the debt or foreclosing and
obtaining a deficiency judgment; an extension of the time period
during which the mortgagor can exercise the equitable right to
redeem; and creation of a statutory right of redemption for a
specified period after the foreclosure sale.
The fifth type limits the size of the deficiency judgment by
giving the debtor credit for the property's fair market value.",
Pennsylvania's Deficiency Judgment Act falls into this category.
Under the Act, a judgment creditor who buys real property in an
execution proceeding and who seeks to collect the balance of the
closure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 901-34 (1980). My catalogue of the types of
statutes is based on Professor Washburn's taxonomy. A state may incorporate
more than one type of statute into its legislation. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§§ 580, 726 (West 1980).
6. Washburn, supra note 5, at 916-19.
7. Id. at 919-26.
8. Id. at 903-07.
9. Id. at 926-34.
10. Id. at 907-16.
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debt must petition the court to fix the real property's fair market
value.l' The value is credited against the amount that the debtor
still owes.'1 As the preceding survey of remedial measures makes
clear, the Act is scarcely radical pro-debtor legislation. For exam-
ple, unlike twenty-seven other states,' 3 Pennsylvania does not
grant the debtor a statutory right of redemption after the foreclo-
sure sale. The Act offers a comparatively temperate method for
protecting the debtor.
In his article, Harris Ominsky complains that the Act imposes
an excessive burden on the mortgage lender. As he is aware, the
Act is pro-debtor legislation designed to favor the mortgagor.
He, however, focuses on the burdens imposed on the lender in a
sophisticated mortgage loan transaction. Unlike parties to a resi-
dential or modest commercial mortgage, all parties to a sophisti-
cated transaction undoubtedly enjoy the representation of
experienced counsel and are aware of the risks they are assuming.
Neither lender nor debtor is in a strong position to claim that its
respective plight deserves greater sympathy on social policy
grounds.
Though Mr. Ominsky may make a strong argument for some
changes in the Act for substantial, complex transactions, I do not
understand him as advocating that these changes apply to defi-
ciency judgments following foreclosures on residences, farms, or
small businesses. I would be interested in seeing a concrete legis-
lative proposal that draws a clear line between substantial, com-
plex transactions and all other transactions. I suspect that
drafting such a proposal would prove to be an extremely difficult
task.
Mr. Ominsky also suggests strategies for lenders and novel
interpretations of a recent court case. I have questions to raise
about both.
II. THE PROCEDURE
Mr. Ominsky asserts that the procedure for obtaining a defi-
ciency judgment is too arduous. The Deficiency Judgment Act,
however, imposes no unusually burdensome requirements.
11. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(a) (Purdon 1982).
12. Id. § 8103(c), (d).
13. See Washburn, supra note 5, at 930 n.478. In addition to states that
grant statutory rights of redemption, Connecticut has a judicially created post-
foreclosure redemption period when strict foreclosure has occurred. See Brand
v. Woolson, 120 Conn. 211, 215, 180 A. 293, 295 (1935).
1154 [Vol. 30: p. 1129
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The Act applies only to the judgment creditor who buys the
debtor's property in an execution proceeding.14 To collect a defi-
ciency judgment, the mortgage lender who has purchased the
property first must obtain a personal judgment against the
debtor.' 5 The lender then must petition the court to fix the prop-
erty's fair market value.1 6 The petition must be filed within six
months of the sale.' 7 In the petition, the lender must assert the
property's fair market value.' 8 If the debtor then fails to file an
answer contesting the asserted value, the court must accept the
value that the lender has claimed.' 9 If the lender's allegation of
fair market value is uncontroverted, the lender may obtain a
speedy determination in the amount it sought.
If the debtor challenges the lender's assertion of fair market
value, the burden on the lender is no heavier than it would be in
any contested litigation. The parties submit appraisals of the
property's value, cross-examine the opposing expert witnesses,
and the court makes its decision.20
Mr. Ominsky lodges two criticisms. First, the lender cannot
proceed against other collateral until the court fixes the prop-
erty's value. In the interim, the assets that constitute such collat-
eral may depreciate or disappear. Second, if the debtor contests
the action for a personal judgment, the lender may be unable to
obtain the judgment within six months of the execution sale. The
Act requires the lender to petition for a fixing of fair market value
within six months of the sale.2' Without a personal judgment in
hand, the lender cannot petition under the Act. The lender
therefore might fail to meet the Act's deadline and lose the right
to seek further satisfaction for the debt.
As for the first criticism, the Act's purpose is to insure that
the lender receives no more than the value of the debt.2 2 In order
14. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(a) (Purdon 1982). See also Shapira Es-
tate, 93 Pitt. L.J. 231, 232 (Allegheny 1945) (Deficiency Judgment Act applies
only when real property has been sold to plaintiff in execution proceedings and
price is insufficient to satisfy judgment).
15. See McDowell Nat'l Bank of Sharon v. Stupka, 310 Pa. Super. 143, 147-
49, 456 A.2d 540, 542-43 (1983) (deficiency judgment petition may not be filed
unless creditor has obtained personal judgment against debtor).
16. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(a) (Purdon 1982).
17. Id. § 8103(d).
18. Id. § 8103(c).
19. Id. § 8103(c)(1).
20. Id. § 8103(c)(2)-(4).
21. Id. § 8103(d).
22. For a discussion of the purpose of the Act, see supra note 2 and accom-
panying text. See also Cheltenham Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pocono Sky Enters.,
19851 1155
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to achieve its purpose, the Act necessarily requires that the court
first fix the fair market value of the debt's primary security before
it permits the lender to reach the debtor's other assets. The Act
thus embodies a policy decision that protecting the debtor is
more important than protecting the lender's right to collateral.2-
The policy decision is hardly radical.
Mr. Ominsky's second criticism seems more theoretical than
real. The lender often can solve the deadline problem by initiat-
ing the action for personal judgment prior to the foreclosure ac-
tion or simultaneously with it.24 The only serious difficulty might
arise when the personal judgment action becomes the subject of
prolonged litigation. If the debtor contests the personal judg-
ment action and the foreclosure, the lender then can move slowly
on the foreclosure proceeding to insure that the personal judg-
ment action first reaches resolution. How commonly the problem
arises remains unclear. Mr. Ominsky cites no cases in which a
creditor faced this predicament and lost the opportunity to obtain
a deficiency judgment.
In summary, the Act's procedural requirements seem unex-
ceptional and highly unlikely to confront the lender with an insur-
mountable problem.
III. STRATEGIES FOR FIRST AND SECOND MORTGAGES
Mr. Ominsky advises creditors holding both the first and sec-
ond mortgage on a property to foreclose on the second mort-
gage, which presumably is the smaller of the two. He argues that
the lender then can obtain a personal judgment for the larger
debt secured by the first mortgage without first proceeding under
the Act.
Mr. Ominsky further suggests that the lender can deprive the
debtor of any credit toward the debt secured by the second mort-
gage. According to the argument, the lender first would foreclose
305 Pa. Super. 471, 479, 451 A.2d 744, 748 (1982) (objective of Act was to
relieve debtor of further liability if property taken over by creditor had fair value
sufficient to permit creditor to dispose of property without net loss on
transaction).
23. See Cheltenham, 305 Pa. Super. at 480, 451 A.2d at 749.
24. See Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Sobolewski, 325 Pa. 422, 426-27, 190 A. 919,
922 (1937) (mortgagee may pursue its remedies under both mortgage and bond
at same time, although limited to one ultimate satisfaction); Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank v. Lutherland, Inc., 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 314, 316-17 (Monroe 1972) (it is well
established that mortgagee may proceed on both obligations that evidence the
debt at the same time, but if both obligations are reduced to judgment mortga-
gee may have only single satisfaction of debt).
1156 [Vol. 30: p. 1129
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on the second mortgage and pay a minimal price for the property
at the forced sale. The lender then would seek a deficiency judg-
ment, show that the property was sold subject to the first mort-
gage, and seek to deduct from the sale price the balance owed on
the first mortgage. The deduction would prove larger than the
sale price, and the lender would obtain a personal judgment for
the outstanding balance on the loan secured by the second mort-
gage. The lender then would obtain a personal judgment on the
outstanding balance of the loan secured by the first mortgage
without having to proceed under the Act. The lender also would
own the property.
This strategy raises practical and legal questions. As for the
practicalities, the lender may be able to maximize the borrower's
personal liability by foreclosing on the second mortgage, rather
than the first. Whether increasing the size of the debt would re-
sult in a larger recovery in light of the debtor's financial plight is a
separate question whose answer probably is almost always in the
negative. As for the legal question, I doubt courts would approve
steps designed to give the lender the property and judgments for
the balance owed on both mortgages as well. Mr. Ominsky cites
no cases supporting his position. Any such cases would contra-
dict the thrust of hornbook law. 25 The curious result he expects
would occur only because the same entity is creditor with respect
to the debts secured by the first and second mortgages. Even a
court of limited perceptiveness would recognize that the goal
should be to permit the creditor the opportunity to recover the
remaining debt and no more.2" A court should deduct the prop-
erty's full fair market value from the judgment on the debt se-
cured by the second mortgage.
IV. MORTGAGED PROPERTIES IN DIFFERENT COUNTIES
Mr. Ominsky complains of the problem arising when the
lender secures the debt with a blanket mortgage covering proper-
ties located in different counties. Because county courts of com-
mon pleas exercise jurisdiction over foreclosures and execution
sales, it is impossible to proceed against all properties simultane-
ously. If the lender forecloses on property in one county, it must
25. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
§ 6.14 (1979).
26. See Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Sobolewski, 325 Pa. at 426-27, 190 A. at 922
(1937) (only one recovery permitted on debt); see also Cheltenham Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n. v. Pocono Sky Enters., 305 Pa. Super. at 480, 451 A.2d at 749
(1982) (Act is to be construed liberally to protect debtors and guarantors).
19851 1157
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proceed under the Act before foreclosing on properties in other
counties. Mr. Ominsky argues that the county-by-county proce-
dure results in unnecessary expense and delay.
The solution, however, is simple, and Pennsylvania lenders
have used it. Instead of accepting a blanket mortgage, the lender
need only insist that the mortgagor issue a separate note and
mortgage on the property in each respective county.2 7 The
lender then may foreclose on individual mortgages simultane-
ously or in succession, without having to petition the court for a
deficiency judgment following each foreclosure action.
Mr. Ominsky notes that dicta in First Pennsylvania Bank v. Lan-
caster County Tax Claim Bureau, a 1983 Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decision, argues against requiring compliance with the De-
ficiency Judgment Act when a blanket mortgage covers properties
in different counties. 28 In First Pennsylvania Bank, the borrower
secured a promissory note by giving the lender five separate
mortgages to cover individual properties located in four Penn-
sylvania counties. 29 The lender later foreclosed on three of the
properties and subsequently purchased them at sheriff's sales- 1°
According to the court's dicta, the lender did not need to comply
with the Deficiency Judgment Act after purchasing one property
and before proceeding against the other properties.3' Though
the court's language is not entirely clear, I hesitate to cite the case
as disposing with the need for a judgment creditor to comply with
the Deficiency Judgment Act after buying property at an execu-
tion sale in one county and before foreclosing in another county
on property that falls under the same blanket mortgage. I offer
three reasons.
First, the lender in First Pennsylvania Bank did not hold a blan-
ket mortgage; it held a separate mortgage on each property.32 To
extend the court's dicta to blanket mortgages would overturn by
implication a longstanding recognition by the state's bench and
bar that the Deficiency Judgment Act applies to blanket mort-
gages. The court seemed to acknowledge the continuing validity
27. Mr. Ominsky suggests this strategy in his article. He also advises the
lender to consider cross-collateralization with all separate mortgages recorded
as junior liens on each property and containing cross-default provisions.
28. 504 Pa. 179, 187-90, 470 A.2d 938, 942-44 (1983).
29. Id. at 182, 470 A.2d at 939-40.
30. Id. at 183, 470 A.2d at 940.
31. Id. at 190, 470 A.2d at 944.
32. Id. at 182, 470 A.2d at 939-40.
[Vol. 30: p. 11291158
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of the case on which the longstanding rule is based-13 and ex-
pressly distinguished that case's facts from those of the case at
bar.3
4
Second, First Pennsylvania Bank suggests a reason for treating
separate mortgages differently from blanket mortgages. The
court stated: "We believe a creditor who has bargained for a spe-
cific lien on several parcels should [instead of having to proceed
against all mortgages securing the debtor's obligation in a single
foreclosure action] be able to issue successive executions ...."35
The court in its dicta thus considered the expectations of the
lender and borrower. Given the longstanding Pennsylvania rule
regarding application of the Act to blanket mortgages, the court
could argue that the lender and the borrower presumably under-
stood the consequences of their bargain when they agreed on
separate mortgages as opposed to a blanket mortgage. Accord-
ing to the argument, their negotiations resulted in an agreement
that would favor the lender if the borrower were to default. The
court's dicta arguably respects the parties' expectations. Had the
parties negotiated a blanket mortgage, the court would have frus-
trated their expectations if it had not required compliance with
the Deficiency Judgment Act. The court does not suggest a
change in the accepted interpretation of the Act. It instead per-
mits the parties to choose either of two methods for securing the
debt, one of which is more favorable to the lender than the other.
The dicta thus allows the borrower and lender flexibility in struc-
turing their agreement. Their choice will depend on the relative
33. The rule that the Act applies to blanket mortgage situations derives
from Union Trust Co. v. Tutino, a 1945 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision:
If a mortgage includes more than one tract of land and the execution is
against one tract only, and the plaintiff desires to proceed against other
property belonging to the debtor, he must, within six months, apply to
the court to fix the fair market value of the property sold and credit the
judgment debt with that amount; if he does not do that, the debtor
"shall be released and discharged of such liability."
353 Pa. 145, 149, 44 A.2d 556, 558 (1945).
In First Pennsylvania Bank, the court acknowledged the Tutino decision and did
nothing to cast doubt on its continuing validity. 504 Pa. at 188-89, 470 A.2d at
943.
34. 504 Pa. at 189-90, 470 A.2d at 944. The court stated that it did not
think that "Tutino which involved a creditor's election to execute a personal
judgment against one of two parcels in the same county controls here." Id. The
court's language is not entirely clear, but it supports a reading that the court did
not intend to extend its new theory to assist a lender who has bargained for a
single blanket mortgage, rather than for separate liens. See infra text accompany-
ing note 35.
35. 504 Pa. at 190, 470 A.2d at 944.
19851 1159
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bargaining power of each party.3"
Third, I would hesitate to argue for an extension of dicta
when only two of seven justices ascribe to the dicta itself. Four
justices expressly disassociated themselves from the section of the
opinion that discussed the Deficiency Judgment Act issue, and
one justice concurred only in the case result.3 7
In Valley Trust Company v. Lapitsky, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court rejected the dicta in First Pennsylvania Bank because it fails
to serve the Act's purpose of protecting the debtor. 31 Lenders
thus are best advised not to rely on the First Pennsylvania Bank
dicta.
In summary, Pennsylvania lenders have devised a method for
dealing with the problem that Mr. Ominsky raises. The current
understanding of state law gives lenders and borrowers choices in
how they structure their agreements. The sophistication of lend-
ers and the dearth of cases in the area suggest that the Act does
not set a trap for the unwary. Dicta in First Pennsylvania Bank,
moreover, does not suggest that the standard reading of the Act
is likely to change.
V. FORECLOSING ON REALTY AND PERSONALTY
Mr. Ominsky advises of possible pitfalls for the lender who
secures a loan with a mortgage and security agreement on real
estate and personal property. He notes that Pennsylvania sheriffs
generally will not include personal property in the foreclosure
sale, even if it is listed in the mortgage as security. They will in-
clude only fixtures and equipment essential to a business' opera-
tion as a going concern. This policy is in line with longstanding
Pennsylvania law that a real estate mortgage is not a lien on per-
36. In making this argument, I do not concede that the dicta in First Penn-
sylvania Bank is correct as it applies to separate mortgages. I argue only that the
dicta on separate mortgages does not extend to blanket mortgages. If a lender
must comply with the Act when separate mortgages secure a single note or when
a blanket mortgage secures a single note, the lender still may avoid the Act by
requiring a separate note and mortgage on the property in each respective
county. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. [he borrower and lender,
then, have various methods for structuring an agreement with the different
methods designed to reflect different expectations.
37. In a concurring opinion,Justice Zappala,joined by Justices Nix, Larsen,
and McDermott, expressly disassociated himself from the portion of the First
Pennsylvania Bank case that dealt with the Deficiency Judgment Act and urged
that that portion of the opinion be regarded as dicta. 504 Pa. at 191,470 A.2d at
944 (Zappala,J., concurring). ChiefJustice Roberts concurred only in the result
of the case. Id. at 191, 470 A.2d at 944 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
38. 339 Pa. Super. 177, 182, 488 A.2d 608, 611-12 (1985).
1160 [Vol. 30: p. 1129
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sonal property-aside from the exceptions just noted-even
though the mortgage purports to include personal property. 311 As
Mr. Ominsky explains, this practice makes it difficult to sell real
estate and personal property together as a going business, since
acquisition of the personal property will not be possible until the
lender complies with the Deficiency Judgment Act. The resulting
delay, he argues, deprives the lender of the opportunity to readily
sell a fully equipped business, gives leverage to the borrower in
any negotiations between them, and gives other creditors the
chance to seek satisfaction out of the personal property.
Mr. Ominsky suggests two strategies. First, he suggests that
the lender invoke the industrial plant doctrine. Under the doc-
trine, fixtures and equipment essential to a business' operation as
a going concern are considered part of the realty and will be
transferred at the foreclosure sale as if they were real estate. 40
The lender thus would argue for an expansive application of the
doctrine to personalty.
Second, Mr. Ominsky suggests avoiding the Deficiency Judg-
ment Act by invoking section 9-501(d) of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.4' The Code permits the lender to sell and then buy the
secured personal property at a public sale. The lender thus could
acquire the personal property prior to acquiring the real property
and avoid the requirements of the Deficiency Judgment Act. 42
As for invoking the industrial plant doctrine, Mr. Ominsky
worries that uncertainties in its application may prevent it from
extending to all items that might make attractive the sale of the
39. See 2 G. LADNER, supra note 2, § 12.24.
40. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Reichneder, 371 Pa. 463, 91 A.2d 277, 278-
80 (1952) (holding that beer barrels designed for and used in connection with
operation of a particular brewery were to be considered part of real estate
owned by that business). See generally 2 G. LADNER, su/na note 2, § 12.24(b).
41. Section 9-501(d) of the U.C.C., codified in Pennsylvania, provides:
If the security agreement covers both real and personal property, the
secured party may proceed under this chapter as to the personal prop-
erty or he may proceed as to both the real and the personal property in
accordance with his rights and remedies in respect of the real property
in which case the provisions of this chapter do not apply.
13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9501(d) (Purdon 1984).
42. The Code does not define fixtures more expansively than does real
property law. It treats goods as fixtures "when they become so related to partic-
ular real estate that an interest in them arises under real estate law." Id.
§ 9313(a). See also id. § 9105(b) (applying definition of "fixture" to entire Uni-
form Commercial Code article on secured transactions). Whether the lender
first pursues personalty subject to the security agreement or forecloses on both
the realty and personalty subject to the security agreement, the law concerning
disputed personalty will be the same.
19851 1161
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property as a going business. The risk in applying the doctrine
expansively is that it may favor the lender over the debtor and
over other creditors. The trend of law is running against the in-
dustrial plant doctrine because it sacrifices fairness to all the par-
ties in favor of ease of application. 43 In any case, the doctrine
offers Pennsylvania lenders the opportunity to acquire at least
some personalty at the foreclosure sale.
As for invoking Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code, Mr. Ominsky notes that the value of the personal property
largely depends on the lender's ability to take over the real prop-
erty at a later date and eventually sell both together as a turnkey
operation. Because the personal property's value depends on the
occurence of subsequent events, the lender runs the risk of bid-
ding too high on the personal property. At the same time, Mr.
Ominsky admits that the lender generally faces no difficulty in ac-
quiring the personalty at a reasonable price at the public sale.
Mr. Ominsky proposes revising the Deficiency Judgment Act
by judicial construction or legislative action to make it inapplica-
ble to mortgages covering mixed collateral. For the sophisticated
commercial transaction with which Mr. Ominsky concerns him-
self, I cannot disagree. For residential, farm, and modest com-
mercial transactions, however, I do not think revisions of the Act
are desirable or likely, because they would put the lender in a
more favorable position in relation to the borrower.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Deficiency Judgment Act balances the respective inter-
ests of the mortgage lender, the borrower, and other creditors in
a manner favorable to the borrower. The protection for the bor-
rower may be unnecessary when parties to the transaction are so-
phisticated and are assisted by knowledgeable attorneys. The risk
of revising the Act to exempt these parties is that, wittingly or
unwittingly, the exemption may encompass the less sophisticated.
To call for revisions requires making the case that the Act is op-
pressive as it affects sophisticated transactions. I do not think that
case has been made. As long as any revision risks harm to the
debtor of modest sophistication and resources, revision is un-
43. See Masheter v. Boehm, 37 Ohio St. 2d 68, 76-77, 307 N.E.2d 533, 539-
40 (1974) (criticizing application of the industrial plant doctrine in eminent do-
main proceedings, but also criticizing the doctrine's use in the mortgage
setting),
1162 [Vol. 30: p. 1129
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likely in an era that has seen waves of mortgage defaults 44 and
measures to impose moratoria 45 on foreclosures.
44. As of November 1, 1984, Philadelphia was the city with the seventh
highest rate of foreclosures for mortgages guaranteed by the Federal Housing
Administration. See Franklin, Foreclosures on Houses Rise as Inflation Falls, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 1985, at Al, col. 2. See also Robbins, Despair 11renches Farmers'
Lives as Debts Mount and Land is Lost, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
As of June 30, 1984, about 35% of active borrowers with the Farm Home Ad-
ministration were delinquent. Of the delinquent borrowers, 69% were delin-
quent in an amount greater than 10% of their outstanding principle. U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION ON DELINQUENT BORROWERS IN
FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION MAJOR FARMER LOAN PROGRAMS 1, 3 (Feb. 6,
1985).
45. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Homeowners' Emergency Mortgage Assistance
Act, No. 91, 1983 Pa. Laws 385 (codified in scattered amendments to 35 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1680 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985)).
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